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PROLOGUE
An earlier version of the Essay was presented at the Sixth Annual
LatCrit conference, which was held at the Conference Center at the
University of Florida. As a long-term resident of California who had never
visited Florida, I looked forward to the LatCrit Conference. Unfortunately,
I registered late for the Conference and the Conference Center was full
when I sought to make my reservation and I was forced to look for a motel
near the campus.
Because I was on a tight budget and unfamiliar with Gainesville, I
drove to several inexpensive motels near the campus. After encountering
several "no vacancy" signs, I was heartened to see a vacancy sign at a
Ramada Inn Express near the highway. After checking the rate at the front
desk, the attendant invited me to check out the rooms in a wooded area in
the rear of the motel, which was somewhat removed from the highway.
When I drove to the back of the motel, I noticed that one of the rooms was
open. I decided to check out the room and to inquire about the noise from
the highway. When I walked up to the open door of the room I spotted a
"thirty-something" blonde haired man dressed in Dockers and a golf shirt
who appeared to be inspecting the room. Assuming the man was the motel
manager, I approached to ask whether I could peek at the room. I also
wanted to inquire about the noise from the highway. The man looked
startled, froze, and was unresponsive. After looking me over for an instant,
* Copyright 2002, Alfredo Mirand6.
** Professor of Sociology and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Riverside. He
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the man said "no English" in an accent that sounded like Russian or a
Slavic language. I then realized that he was not the manager but a person
in charge of cleaning the room. I apologized and asked in Spanish, "habla
espafiol"? He shook his head and pointed me toward the main office.
I stayed at the motel for several nights and quickly realized that all of
the staff that performed the housecleaning and maintenance at the motel
were young Eastern European men, who were clearly recent immigrants
and most likely undocumented. I was shocked because I had never seen
White men performing the low paying, minimum wage jobs that Latinas
and Black women normally assumed.
I related the incident in the introduction to my presentation on "The
Mexican Exception to the Fourth Amendment." I used the example to
show how race matters in questions of immigration and to discuss how
race affects one's status as an undocumented alien. The laborers at the
hotel were apparently recently arrived undocumented Eastern European
men who were temporarily working in low status, low paying jobs that are
normally reserved for undocumented Latinos, especially women, and poor
Blacks. Like recent Latino immigrants, these men lacked English-language
skills and immigration papers, but they were afforded certain privileges by
virtue of their race and gender. Because they were phenotypically
indistinguishable from other White men, their undocumented status
became relatively transparent. I, for example, assumed that the man that
I encountered was the manager of the hotel and I would have no such
assumption of a Latina or black motel employee.
This experience is consistent with Cheryl Harris' discussion of the
concept of "Whiteness as Property" and Kimberld Crenshaw's concepts of
intersectionality, and the idea of "White Transparency."' In an insightful
essay, Harris relates the story of her maternal grandmother who was able
to "pass" and gain employment at a major retail store in Chicago's central
business district in the 1930s because of "her fair skin, straight hair, and
aquiline features." 2 Harris argues that in the United States, Whiteness is
property in that it confers legal rights.3 Historically, Whiteness not only
defined the legal status of a person as slave or free but White identity also
"conferred tangible and economically valuable benefits, and it was
jealously guarded as a valued possession, allowed only to those who met
a strict standard of proof."4 Crenshaw further explores the intersectionality

1. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MovEMENT (Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter
CRITICAL RACE THEORY].

2. Id. at 276-302.
3. Id. at 280-84.
4. Id. at 280.
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of race and gender, which is manifested through White transparancy' In
the dominant society and in antidiscrimination law, women are presumed
to be White and people of color are presumed to be men.6 She suggests
that the concept of intersectionality7 be used to better understand the unique
subordination of women of color.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.'
The Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, and it governs conduct of federal and state governmental
agents. 9
Though the Amendment does not categorically prohibit warrantless
searches, it ostensibly protects the people from "unreasonable" searches
and seizures. The Supreme Court has, through various decisions,
reaffirmed that warrantless searches are not only suspect but are presumed
to be unreasonable.' 0 A "cardinal principle" of Fourth Amendment law is
that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.' '1
In reality, however, the per se rule has not been closely observed. Since
Terry v. Ohio," the Court has carved out a number of exceptions, so that
there is justifiable concern that the exceptions may have swallowed up the
rule. In a concurring opinion in California v. Acevedo, 3 Justice Scalia
commented that though by the 1960s it appeared that the warrant
requirement had won out theoretically, the victory was illusory because the
5. Kimberld Crenshaw, Race, Reform, andRetrenchment: TransformationandLegitimation
in AntidiscriminationLaw, inCRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1.
6. id. at 103-22.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.

10. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11. Id. at 357.
12. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
13. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
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warrant requirement "had become so riddled with exceptions that it was
basically unrecognizable."' 4 Scalia added that one commentator had
catalogued almost twenty exceptions, such as automobile, border, and
exigent circumstance searches, as well as any searches incident to arrests. 5
In this Essay, I examine whether there is also a "Mexican exception"
to the Fourth Amendment. While there is clearly a Border exception to the
Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches and seizures of persons who are
"Mexican looking" are commonplace and extend well beyond the limits
of the Border. After examining relevant case law and judicial opinions, I
conclude that there is considerable support for the view that with regard
to suspected alienage status, there is a de facto, unwritten Mexican
exception to the Fourth Amendment. A related question examined is
whether non-resident aliens have sufficient connection to the United States
to be considered one of "the people."
II. TENSION BETWEEN NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

In 1990, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property owned
by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country. 6 Respondent Rene
Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was a
suspected leader of a large and violent organization and a narcotics
smuggler. 7 Mexican officials, after consulting with U.S. marshals,
apprehended Respondent and took him to the Border Patrol station located
in Calexico, California. 8 United States marshals subsequently arrested
Verdugo-Urquidez and transported him to a correctional center in San
Diego, where he awaited his trial.' 9
Following the arrest, DEA agents, working in cooperation with
Mexican authorities, carried out a warrantless search of VerdugoUrquidez's properties in Mexicali and San Felipe, Mexico, seizing
documents believed to implicate Respondent in drug trafficking, including
a tally sheet which the government alleged reflected the quantities of
marijuana smuggled into the United States.20

14. Id. at 581-82 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
15. Id. at 582 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 MICH.L. REV.1468, 1473-74 (footnote omitted)) (quotation marks omitted) (final
alteration in original).
16. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990).
17. Id. at 262.
18. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id. at 262-63.
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The district court granted his motion to suppress the evidence seized
subsequent to the searches and concluded that the agents had failed to
justify searching his residence absent a search warrant. A divided panel of
the court of appeals affirmed."' While recognizing that an American
search warrant would have no legal validity in Mexico, the court of
appeals concluded that a warrant would have "substantial constitutional
value in this country," in that it would reflect an independent judgment by
a magistrate that there was probable cause and it would have defined the
scope of the search. 2

The Supreme Court reversed.23 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that historical evidence shows that the intent of the Fourth
Amendment was to protect the public from arbitrary governmental action.
"It was never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the
actions of the federal government against aliens outside of the United
States territory."24 He added that there is no indication that the Framers
intended to extend Fourth Amendment protections to activities of the
United States aimed at aliens who were on foreign soil or in international
waters."
The Chief Justice further maintained that "the people" was somehow
a "term of art" which "refers to a class of persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that community."26
Although Verdugo-Urquidez was lawfully present in the United States,
though brought in against his will, the Court determined that he lacked
sufficient connection with the United States to be considered one of "the
people. 27
The Rehnquist majority added that there was no indication that the
Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to serve as a restraint on actions
by the Federal government against aliens outside the United States or in
international waters. 2 ' In fact, in 1798, just seven years after the
amendment was ratified, Congress passed an act to "protect the Commerce
of the United States," which authorized the President of the United States
to "instruct the commanders of the public armed vessels which are, or
which shall be employed in the service of the United States, to subdue,

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 263 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Id. at 263-64 (quoting Verdugo-Uriquidez, 856 F.2d at 1230) (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 275.
Id. at 266.
Id at 267.
Id. at265.
See id at 271.
Id. at 266-67.
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seize and take any armed French vessel, which shall be found within the
jurisdictional limits of the United States, or elsewhere, on the high seas."29
The Court also noted that the global view of the Constitution taken by
the court of appeals was contrary to the decision in the Insular Cases,
which established that not every constitutional protection applies to
governmental activity, even in areas where the United States has sovereign
power. ° The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, for example, was found
to not be applicable in Puerto Rico,3 nor in the Philippines.32 In
distinguishing Verdugo-Urquidezfrom INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,3" where a
majority of the Justices assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to
illegal aliens in the United States,34 the Court noted that the question
decided in Lopez-Mendoza was whether the exclusionary rule should be
extended to civil deportation proceedings, not whether Fourth Amendment
protections are extended to illegal aliens in this country.35 Even assuming
that illegal aliens are entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, the Court
felt the situation of illegals is different from that of Verdugo-Urquidez in
that he had no "voluntary connection" with this country that would qualify
him as one of the people. 6
In Lopez-Mendoza, Respondent, Adan Lopez-Mendoza, a citizen of
Mexico, was arrested in 1976 by INS agents while working at a
transmission repair shop in San Mateo, California.3 7 The proprietor of the
shop refused to let agents interview his employees during work hours, but
as one agent engaged the proprietor, another went to the back of the shop
and started questioning Lopez-Mendoza." When questioned, Respondent
provided his name, said he was from Mexico and had "no close family ties
in the United States."39 The agent then placed him under arrest and took
him to INS's offices.' After additional questioning, Lopez-Mendoza
admitted that he was a citizen of Mexico and that he had entered the
United States without inspection.4 The agents prepared a "Record of

29. Id. at 267 (quoting An Act Further to Protect the Commerce of the United States, ch. 68,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 578 (1798)) (quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. at 268.
31. Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304-05, 313 (1922).
32. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904).
33. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
34. See id at 1034.
35. Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. at 272.
36. Id. at 273.
37. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035. The Court also decided a companion case involving
another Mexican national, Elias Sandoval-Sanchez. Id. at 1034-35.
38. Id. at 1035.
39. Id.

40. Id
41. Id.
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Deportable Alien" (Form 1-213), and an affidavit executed by Respondent
where he admitted his illegal entry into the United States.42
During the hearing before an Immigration Judge, Lopez-Mendoza
moved to terminate the proceedings, arguing that he had been arrested
illegally.43 The Judge held that the legality of the arrest was not relevant
in a deportation proceeding and found Lopez-Mendoza deportable,
affording the option of voluntary departure." The appeal was dismissed by
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).45 But the court of appeals
vacated the order of deportation and remanded the case in order to
determine whether his Fourth Amendment constitutional rights were
infringed at the time of his arrest.'
In a majority opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, the Court reversed
the court of appeals, holding that credible evidence gathered in connection
with peaceful arrests by INS officers does not have to be suppressed in an
INS civil deportation hearing.47 Applying the Janis balancing test, the
Court concluded that the benefits of excluding reliable evidence from a
deportation proceeding would not outweigh the social costs.4" The Court
believed, in other words, that the deterrent value of applying the
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings would not exceed the social
costs that would be incurred by its application.49
Several factors would reduce the deterrent value of the exclusionary
rule in a civil deportation proceeding."0 First, even if the exclusionary rule
were to apply, deportation would be possible because evidence not
obtained directly from the arrest would be used to justify deportation.5 '
Thus, the only things for the Government to establish are identity and
alienage, and then the burden shifts to the Respondent to prove the time,
location, and mode of entry. 2
The second factor is based on practical concerns. 3 In a typical year, an
INS officer makes approximately 500 arrests of suspected illegal aliens,
and less than three percent agree to voluntary departure.54 Because most
INS agents know that the lawfulness of the arrest is not likely to be

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id
Id. at 1035-36.
Id.at 1036.
Id.
Id.at 1051.
Id.at 1042.
See id. at 1042-43.
Id.at 1043.
Id.
In re Sandoval, 17 1.& N. Dec. 70,79 (B.I.A. 1979).
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044.
Id.
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challenged in a formal deportation hearing," the exclusionary rule would
have limited deterrent value.
The third factor offered by the Court is that the INS reportedly has
"extensive training" on Fourth Amendment law for new immigration
officers and a comprehensive scheme for protecting against Fourth
Amendment violations.56 Since most arrests not along the border involve
workplace raids, the INS has developed rules restricting stop,
interrogation, and arrest practices to protect individuals lawfully present
at the inspected work place. 7
Finally, the Court concluded in Lopez-Mendoza that the social costs
would not outweigh the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule in
deportation proceedings." One cost ostensibly is that application of the
exclusionary rule would entail having the Court "close its eyes" to ongoing
violations of the law. 9 Justice O'Connor remarked:
Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule
should be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering
corrective action at a leaking hazardous waste dump if the
evidence underlying the order had been improperly obtained,
or to compel police to return contraband explosives or drugs
to their owner if the contraband had been unlawfully seized.6'
Paraphrasing Justice Cardozo's famous quote, Justice O'Connor concluded
that "[t]he constable's blunder may allow the criminal to go free..., but
he should not go free within our borders.""
In INS v. Delgado,62 a case decided in the same term as LopezMendoza, the Supreme Court held that "factory surveys" (raids) carried
out by the INS were not seizures of the entire work force, and that
questioning of individual workers by INS agents did not constitute an
impermissible detention or seizure." The decision rejected the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals holding that "factory surveys" constituted "a
seizure of the entire work force" and that the INS agents could not
interogate individuals absent reasonable suspicion that the employee to be
questioned was in the country illegally.' 4

55. Id.
56. See id.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 1046, 1050.
59. /, at 1046.

60. Id.
61. Id at 1047 (footnote omitted).

62. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
63. Id. at 212.

64. Id.
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The agents had acted after obtaining two warrants after the INS showed
probable cause that the Davis Pleating Plant in Southern California
employed many illegal aliens, but neither search warrant contained the
name of any illegal aliens.65 During the survey, armed INS agents were
stationed near the building exits, as other agents moved throughout the
factory and questioned workers at their work areas.' The agents showed
badges, had walkie-talkies, and carried arms, though they never drew their
weapons.67
The Respondents in Delgado, four employees questioned in one of the
three surveys who were legal residents of the United States,6 8 maintained
that the factory raids "violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches [and] seizures and the equal protection
'
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."69
In rejecting Respondents' Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, the
Court noted that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all contact
between the police and citizens."0 Relying on Terry, the Court noted that
"not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves
'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force
or show of authority, has restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."" The standard that has evolved
over time is that an initially consensual encounter can be transformed into
a seizure or detention, "if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
to leave."'
The critical issue before the Court, therefore, was whether, under
similar circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was free to leave." In Florida v. Royer, 4 Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) Agents approached the defendant at an airport and
asked him for his airplane ticket and driver's license, which the agents
then examined." In a plurality opinion, a majority of the Court agreed that
the request and examination of the documents were "permissible in

65. Id.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 213 n.I. Respondents Herman Delgado and Ramona Correa worked at Davis

Pleating and were permanent resident aliens. Id.
69. Id at213.
70. Id at 215.
71. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968)) (quotation marks omitted).

72. Id. (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)); see also Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
73. See Delgado,466 U.S. at 215.
74. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
75. Id. at 493-94.
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themselves."76 In Brown v. Texas," however, the Court held that the
physical detention of Respondent without reasonable suspicion of
misconduct violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable seizures. 8
The Delgado Court noted that the fact that most people will respond
positively to such a request does not negate its consensual nature,79 "unless
the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate
that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he
had not responded... ."0 Writing for the Delgado majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that the way Respondents were questioned "could hardly
result in a reasonable fear that [Riespondents were not free to continue
working or to move about the factory."" The Court, therefore, held that
these were classic consensual stops that are not constitutionally
prohibited.'
3 the Supreme Court held that
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,"

Border Patrol stops at permanent checkpoints operated away from the
international border are constitutional." In rejecting Respondents' request
to exclude evidence relating to the transportation of illegal aliens, the
Court held that the operation of a fixed checkpoint need not be authorized
in advance by a judicial warrant and that stops at "reasonably located
checkpoints" may be made without any individualized suspicion that the
particular vehicle contains illegal aliens.8 5
While recognizing that checkpoint stops are in fact Fourth Amendment
seizures in balancing the public interest in the practice of routine stops to
control the flow of illegal aliens with the limited intrusion on Fourth
Amendment rights, the Court concluded that the government interest was
greater than the interests of individual citizens. ' The Court added that
it is constitutional to refer motorists selectively to the
secondary inspection area at the San Clemente checkpoint on
the basis of criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol
stop. Thus, even if it be assumed that such referrals are made

76. Id. at 501.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

443 U.S. 47 (1979).
Id. at 52.
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
Id.
Id. at 220-2 1.
Id. at 221.
428 U.S. 543 (1976).

84. Id. at 545.
85. Id at 557, 562, 566.
86. Id. at 556, 560-61.
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largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we

perceive no constitutional violation. 7

The stop may intrude on person's right to "free passage without
interruption" to a certain extent, but it entails only a limited detention of
travelers, and does not involve searching vehicles or its occupants.88
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan observed that the Court's
decision effectively evicirates the Amendment's reasonableness
requirement by holding that law enforcement officials can make
"standardless" stops without violating the Fourth Amendment. 9
III. ROVING PATROLS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Border Patrol conducts three types of surveillance along inland
roadways, all presumably designed to detect the illegal importation of
aliens. Permanent checkpoints, as in Martinez-Fuerte,are maintained at
key intersections"° like the Temecula and San Clemente checkpoints in
Southern California. Temporary checkpoints are also set from time to time
at various locations. 9' In addition, the Border Patrol has roving patrols
such as the one involved in the search of Petitioner's car in AlmeidaSanchez v. United States.9'

In all three types of surveillance, it is argued that the conduct of the
Border Patrol agents is constitutional where automobiles are detained and
searched without a warrant, without probable cause that the automobile
contains aliens, and even without probable cause to suspect that the cars
made a border crossing. 93 The only justification for relaxing the
constitutional protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment is provided
by section 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 233,
8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a)(3), which permits warrantless searches of vehicles
"within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United
States." The Attorney General's regulation, 8 CFR § 287.1, defines
"reasonable distance" as being "within 100 air miles from any external
'
boundary of the United States."94
The facts in Almedia-Sanchez were clear and were not disputed. 9
Petititioner, a Mexican citizen with a valid work permit, was convicted

87. Id. at 563 (footnote omitted).
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 557-58 (citations omitted).
dissenting).
Id. at 568 (Brennan, J.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 267.
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because he knowingly received, concealed, and facilitated the
transportation of a large quantity of illegally imported marihuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176a." The only issue on appeal was whether the
search of his automobile was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment such that under the rule of Weeks v. United States, 97 the
marihuana should have been excluded. 98
Border Patrol agents stopped Almeida-Sanchez on California Highway
78, twenty-five miles north of the border." The highway runs East-West,
north of Highway 80, and partly through an undeveloped area. Highway
78 never reaches the Mexican Border, nor did Almeida-Sanchez, who was
some 100 air miles from the Border when he was stopped. 0
Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
the search of Almeida-Sanchez's vehicle was not a "border search," it
upheld the search, based on section 287 (a) (3) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.'' The Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of
the Petitioner's automobile without probable cause or consent was, a
violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free of "unreasonable
searches and seizures." 0 2 The search could not be justified on the basis of
special rules applicable to automobile searches because there was no
probable cause.'0 3 Nor could the search be justified as an "administrative
inspection," as the officers had no warrant or reason to think that Petitioner
had crossed the border or committed an offense, and Petitioner did not
consent to the search."° In the majority opinion, Justice Stewart noted that
"[i]t is undenied that the Border Patrol had no search warrant, and that
there was no probable cause... not even the 'reasonable suspicion' found

sufficient for a street detention and weapons search in Terry v. Ohio, and
Adams v. Williams."'i 5
In UnitedStates v. Ortiz,'°6Border Patrol agents stopped Respondent's
car at a checkpoint on Highway 5 in San Clemente, California, and
conducted a routine search of the automobile."° The agents found three
illegal aliens hiding in the trunk of the car, and Respondent was

96.
97.
98.
added).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 267 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (footnote
Id. at 267-68.
Id
Id. at 268-69 (referring to 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2000)).
Id. at273.
Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 270-72.
Id. at 268 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
422 U.S. 891 (1975).
Id. at 891-92.
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subsequently convicted of three counts of knowingly transporting illegal
aliens.'"8 The court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that Border Patrol agents may not search private vehicles without
consent or probable cause at traffic checkpoints removed from the
border. 9
The San Clemente checkpoint is sixty-two air miles and sixty-six road
miles north of the Mexican border and is located on the principal highway
between San Diego and Los Angeles."' Over ten million vehicles pass the
checkpoint yearly. "' The San Clemente checkpoint has been described as
follows:
Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint is a large
black on yellow sign with flashing yellow lights over the
highway stating "ALL VEHICLES, STOP AHEAD, 1
MILE." Three-quarters of a mile further north are two black
on yellow signs suspended over the highway with flashing
lights stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of California
weighing station, are two large signs with flashing red lights
suspended over the highway. These signs each state "STOP
HERE-U.S. OFFICERS". [sic] Placed on the highway are
a number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two
lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform,
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks traffic.
Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U.S. Border
Patrol vehicles with flashing red lights. In addition, there is a
permanent building which houses the Border Patrol office and
temporary detention facilities. There are also floodlights for
nighttime operation."'
Although the Border Patrol would like to keep the checkpoint in
operation at all times, it is closed about one-third of the time either
because ofbad weather, heavy traffic, or a shortage ofpersonnel. "3 "When
the checkpoint is open, all northbound traffic is checked, and if an officer
suspects that a vehicle is carrying aliens, the officer will stop the car and
question the occupants about their citizenship." 4 If the officer remains
suspicious, the officer will inspect portions of the vehicle." 5 The

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 892.
Id. at 896-97.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308, 312 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id.
United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 410-11 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 893.
Id.
Id. at 893-94.
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procedure is similar at other checkpoints, but at some, traffic is light
enough that all vehicles can be stopped and more of the vehicles are
routinely inspected." 6
In Ortiz, the Government maintained that there were unique conditions
which justified suspending the probable cause requirement at traffic
checkpoints, despite the Court's prior holding in Almeida-Sanchez, and
offered two reasons to distinguish traffic checkpoints and roving patrols. "7
First, the Government argued, at a traffic checkpoint, the officer exercised
less discretion in deciding which cars to search because the location of the
checkpoint is set by high-level Border Patrol officials, using factors such
as the level of inconvenience to the public, safety considerations, and the
potential for apprehending illegal aliens."' By contrast, prior to Almeida-

Sanchez, Border Patrol agents on roving patrol had the discretion to stop
any car within one hundred miles of the Border." 9 Second, the
Government argued that the conditions surrounding a fixed checkpoint
stop are much less intrusive and
invasive and, therefore, less likely to
120
motorists.
embarrass
or
shock
Rejecting these arguments, the Court in Ortiz concluded that,
While the differences between a roving patrol and a
checkpoint would be significant in determining the propriety
of the stop, which is considerably less intrusive than a
search, ... they do not appear to make any difference in the

search itself. The greater regularity attending the stop does
not mitigate the invasion of privacy that a search entails. Nor
do checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the likelihood
of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are searched, unlike
those who are only questioned, may not be reassured by
seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as well.
Where only a few are singled out for a search, as at San
Clemente, motorists may find the searches especially
offensive.
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint limits
to any meaningful extent the officer's discretion to select cars
for search. The record in the consolidated proceeding
indicates that only about 3 [percent] of the cars that pass the
San Clemente
2 checkpoints are stopped for either questioning
or a search.' '

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 894.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 894-95.
121. Id. at 895-96 (citations omitted).
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The Court was unpersuaded that the differences between roving patrols
and checkpoints justified dispensing with the safeguards required in
Almeida-Sanchez.'22 The Court, therefore, held that at all traffic
checkpoints removed from the Border, or its functional equivalent,
searches of private vehicles, are unconstitutional unless there is consent or
probable cause.'23
2 4 the Supreme Court overturned
However, in UnitedStates v. Peltier,"

the Ninth Circuit's reversal of Peltier's conviction on a federal narcotics
offense in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California. 25 Four months prior to the Supreme Court handing down its
ruling in Almeida-Sanchez, a roving border patrol stopped Peltier's
automobile and discovered 270 pounds of marihuana in the trunk.
Respondent was charged with a violation of 84 Stat. 1260, 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1).12 6 After the Court denied Peltier's motion to suppress the
evidence, Respondent stipulated that he "did knowingly and intentionally
possess, with intent to distribute, the marihuana concealed in the 1962
Chevrolet which he was driving... ." Respondent was convicted by the
district court. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed, holding that the
"rule announced by the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States... should be applied to similar cases pending on appeal on the date
the Supreme Court's decision was announced."'" 7
While Respondent's appeal was pending before the United States Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court held in Almeida-Sanchez that a warrantless
automobile search, some twenty-five air miles from the Mexican border
was unconstitutional, absent probable cause.'28 In Peltier,the Government
admitted that the search of Peltier's car some seventy miles from the
Border and the seizure of the marihuana were not constitutionally
permitted under the standard announced in Almeida-Sanchez, but it argued
that the standard should not be applied to searches conducted before the
Almeida-Sanchez decision was issued.2 9

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed.' In a five person majority
authored by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that considerations of
judicial integrity and of deterrence of unlawful police conduct, which were
the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment, did not require that the
122. See id. at 896-97.
123. Id (footnote omitted).
124. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
125. Id. at 542.
126. Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
127. 422 U.S. 531, 532 (1975) (citing United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985, 986 (9th Cir.
1974) (footnotes omitted)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added) (last omission in original).
128. 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
129. Id. at 533 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 542.
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Almeida-Sanchez decision be applied retroactively to searches conducted
prior to the date of the decision, since prior to that decision:
(1) Border Patrol agents had acted pursuant to statutory
and regulatory authority to conduct warrantless searches, and
(2) The United States Court of Appeals had repeatedly
upheld roving border patrol searches.'
When Peltier's car was stopped and searched, the Border Patrol agents
were acting pursuant to section 287(a)(3) of the Immigration Act of 1952,
which authorizes officers to search vehicles "within a reasonable distance
from any external boundary of the United States" without a warrant.'32
Pursuant to this statutory authorization, the Attorney General formulated
regulations establishing "reasonable distance" as "100 air miles from any
external boundary of the United States."' 3 3 Hence, since the officers were
acting reasonably and pursuant to statutory authorization, "'the imperative
of judicial integrity' is not offended by the introduction into evidence of
that material even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure have
broadened34the exclusionary rule to encompass evidence seized in that

manner."'
What is ironic about the decision in Peltieris that had the Respondent
been stopped four months later it would have been unconstitutional, but
since he was stopped prior to the court's decision in Almeida-Sanchez, the
stop was constitutional
and the conviction would not be reversed
35
retroactively.1
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce36 was decided on the same day as
Ortiz.3 ' In Brignami-Ponce,two Border Patrol agents were working the
San Clemente checkpoint on Interstate 5.13' As the checkpoint was closed
because of inclement weather, the agents were checking northbound traffic
from a parked patrol car. 39 Because the4 road was dark, the officers used

their headlights to illuminate the road. 1

The Court held that except at the border or its functional equivalents,
officers on roving patrols or at fixed checkpoints may not stop vehicles,

131. Id. at 541.
132. 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2000).
133. 422 U.S. at 539-40 (footnotes omitted) (citing 22 Fed. Reg. 9808 (1957), as amended, 29
Fed. Reg. 13244 (1964), 8 CFR § 287.1(a)(2) (1973).
134. Id. at 537 (citations omitted).
135. See generally id.
136. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
137. Compare id. at 873, with United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 891 (1975).
138. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 874.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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unless they are able to articulate specific facts, that along with rational
inferences from such facts, create a reasonable suspicion that the persons
who are in the vehicles are in United States illegally.' 4' Here the officers
did not have reasonable suspicion, relying exclusively on the "Mexican
ancestry of the occupants" of the vehicle. 42
IV. RACIAL PROFILING AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Although courts have consistently held that police and Border Patrol
stops based on race or national origin are impermissible violations of the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,
law enforcement continues to use race as a primary determinant in making
automobile stops. In UnitedStates v. Mallides,'43 defendant was convicted
of aiding and abetting illegal entry of aliens under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 8
U.S.C. § 1325'" in the United States Magistrate Court for the Southern
District of California. He appealed, arguing that the conviction resulted
from the introduction of evidence that was the product of an unlawful
detention and thus the evidence should have been suppressed. 45 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of California
affirmed the conviction.'" On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction, holding that the fact that several "MexicanAmerican appearing" males were riding in a sedan at dusk, and "sitting
erectly"47 would not justify stopping them on suspicion of being illegal
aliens.
Police officers spotted defendant's older model Chrysler Imperial
turning onto Airport Road in the city of Oceanside. 48 Mallides' 49 conduct
was not suspicious or unusual.'" He did not drive erratically or behave in
a suspicious manner. "' The articulated facts upon which the officers based
the stop was that "six Mexican-American appearing males were riding in
a Chrysler Imperial at dusk, sitting erectly, and none turned to look at the
passing patrol car."' 52

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 884.
Id. at 885-86.
473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 860.
Id.
United States v. Mallides, 339 F. Supp. 1,4 (S.D. Cal. 1972).

147. Mallides, 473 F.2d at 861, 862.

148. Id. at 860.
149. "Mallides[, in fact,] was not of Mexican origin." Id. at 860 n. I. He was a naturalized
United States citizen who was born in Iraq. Id.
150. Id. at 861 (footnote added).
151. Id. at 860.
152. Id. at 861.
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The court noted that the same constitutional standards are applied to the
conduct of state police officers as to federal law enforcement officers." 3
While the driver of a vehicle and a pedestrian are in somewhat different
circumstances, the Ninth Circuit applied the Terry v. Ohio standard to
automobile searches so that the validity of the stop is assessed according
to two criteria."M First, "was the officers' action justified" in the first place
and second, was it "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.""' For the stop to be justifiable,
"the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion." '56
The court held that because "[t]he stop and detention were illegal," the
result of such illegal conduct is inadmissible."5 7 There is nothing inherently
suspicious about six people together in a sedan, sitting erect, and "[t]he
conduct does not become suspicious simply because the skins of the
occupants are nonwhite or because they sit up straight or because they do
not look at a passing police car." ' 8
Similarly, in United States v. Sanchez- Vargas,"9 the defendant was
convicted of a violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A), and 1324(a)(1)(B)
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, for bringing an alien into the
United States illegally and for illegally transporting an alien within the
United States.1 6° Border Patrol Agent Scott stopped Sanchez-Vargas while
he was driving a light-colored vehicle in the vicinity of the Otay Mesa Port
of Entry.' 6 1 Agent Scott testified that minutes prior to the stop, he had
received radio transmissions from two other agents. 62 One agent had said
he had seen three vehicles, a van, a pickup, and a light-colored car "driving
through the international boundary fence west of the Otay Mesa Port of
Entry." 63The second officer reported that he had observed the light-color
auto, making two U-turns and that it was heading north.'" Agent Scott
initiated 65a high-speed chase and subsequently apprehended SanchezVargas.1

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 860.
Id. at 861.
Id. (citing and quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 20 (1968)).
Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21) (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 862.
Id. at861.
878 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo and held that Scott
had justifiably "founded suspicion" to stop Sanchez-Vargas.'" All of the
facts taken together, including the radio transmissions of the other two
agents and his own personal observations, gave Scott "specific and
articulable facts sufficient
to warrant an investigative stop of Sanchez67
Vargas' vehicle.'
In a related case, Inez Ramon Salinas had entered a conditional guilty
plea, agreeing to one count of marijuana possession with intent 16
to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D). 1
Salinas appealed the conviction, arguing "that the district court erred [in]
denying his motion to suppress the evidence because the officer who
stopped his vehicle lacked founded suspicion of criminal conduct."' 69
Officer Moreno was patrolling the heavy morning traffic on State
Highway 80, a two lane road running North from Mexico into Arizona,
when he observed Salinas' automobile, a white Pontiac traveling
northward at normal speed.7 The vehicle was an older model, which,
based on Officer Moreno's experience, was often used for drug and alien
smuggling. The vehicle also appeared loaded down, the driver was of
Spanish or Mexican origin, and that as the vehicle passed, the driver
"glanced at him."'' The factors lead Agent Moreno to follow [Salinas]."
After following the vehicle for four or five miles, Moreno noticed there
was dust on the trunk of the vehicle and fresh handprints visible on it. 3
A registration check revealed that the vehicle was duly registered in
Bisbee, near Naco, a town which repeatedly had a large concentration of
drug and alien smugglers."
Salinas moved to suppress the marijuana on the ground that Moreno
lacked founded suspicion to stop the vehicle. ' The Ninth Circuit agreed,
holding that the agent lacked founded suspicion to make the investigatory
stop. 76 "Thousands of United States citizens of Mexican ancestry drive old
cars on perfectly legitimate errands, with 100 pounds of potatoes or
carpenter tools or other commodities weighing down the rear springs. A

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 1166.
Id.
United States v. Salinas, 940 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id.

170. Id.
171. Id.

172. Id. at 393-94.
173. Id. at 394.
174. Id.

175. Id. at 393-94.
176. Id. at 393.
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driver who glances at a border patrol car does not thereby become a
suspicious character."'
Similarly in Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS,17s the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals reversed the deportation order ofMario Gonzalez-Rivera, holding
that Border Patrol Officers stopped the deportee solely on the basis of his
Hispanic appearance and that the stop was an "egregious constitutional
violation." ' Gonzalez-Rivera appealed to the Ninth Circuit after the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the Immigration Judge's
(IJ) ruling that the Border Patrol agents stopped the deportee simply
because of his "Hispanic appearance."' "s
Gonzalez was riding in the car his father was driving. They were
traveling north on Highway 805 near San Diego" when two Border Patrol
Agents stopped the car." 2 The agents discovered that Gonzalez' father was
in the United States legally, but Gonzalez could not produce documents
showing he was in the United States legally.' After arresting Gonzalez,
the agents learned that he had entered the United States without
inspection." 4 Gonzalez requested a deportation hearing without signing
any documents or making any sworn statements.'ss
At the deportation hearing, Gonzalez filed a written motion to suppress
evidence, arguing that his detention, arrest, and interrogation, were "an
egregious violation of his Fourth Amendment rights," because he was
stopped simply based on his Hispanic appearance.' 6At the hearing, the8I-7
213 Form was admitted into evidence despite Gonzalez' objection.
Officer Wilson testified that Highway 805 is a major corridor of alien
smuggling, that almost everyone who travels the highway is of Hispanic
origin, and that there was nothing wrong or suspicious about the vehicle
or the way that Gonzalez was driving.' On the stand, Wilson said he
based the stop on the following factors:
(1) Gonzalez and his father appeared to be Hispanic; (2) both
of them sat-up straight, looked straight ahead and did not turn
their heads to acknowledge the Border Patrol car; (3)

at395.
177. Id.
178. 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).
179. Id. at 1443.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.

183. Id
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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395

Gonzalez' mouth appeared to be "dry"; (4) Gonzalez was
blinking; and (5) both men appeared to be nervous. 9
However, after reading the 1-213 Form to refresh his recollection,
Wilson contradicted himself.1 He changed his description and said "that
when [Gonzalez and his father] saw us, they turned, they turned and
looked at us, and right away turned their heads, and just sat straight." He
could not remember what Gonzalez was wearing, except that he had on a
cap. 9' The INS attorney stated that while "everybody who is wearing a
cap is not an illegal alien,

. .

all [of] these facts put together, seem to

192
indicate articulable facts,.., to make a reasonable stop."'
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the IJ and concluded that the officers
stopped Gonzalez because of his Hispanic appearance and that all of the
other alleged factors "for the stop were either fabricated or of such
minimal probative value in determining whether Gonzalez and his father
looked suspicious that no reasonable officer would have relied on them."' 93
The Ninth Circuit noted that "[iun Brignoni-Ponce,the Supreme Court
" 94
held that 'Hispanic appearance alone is insufficient to justify a stop.
The Ninth Circuit added that because this was an egregious violation ofthe
Fourth Amendment, the court was required to suppress the evidence. 95

V. RIGHTS, MEMBERSHIP, AND PERSONHOOD

The answer to the question of whether there is a Mexican Exception to
the Fourth Amendment is at once both complex and at the same time
remarkably simple. While the federal courts have consistently held that in
principle, Hispanic or Mexican appearance is not sufficient to justify a
stop, they also have held that Hispanic appearance is one of several factors
that may, in conjunction with other articuable facts which, as in Terry,
"taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.' 96
The reality, of course, is that there is a Mexican Exception. Mexican
appearing persons are routinely stopped with articulable facts that are
consistent with law-abiding behavior such as driving on a highway within

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id. at 1443-44.
Id. at 1444 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 1447.
Id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975)).
Id. at 1452.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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100 air miles of the border, 97 driving a late model sedan,19 wearing a
cap,'9 9 and driving a car that appears to be weighed down" 0 or has a
number of passengers in it.2°! Mexican-appearing persons are also placed
in a catch-22 situation where either looking at the officers or not looking
at the officers may be interpreted as suspicious conduct.
Martinez-Fuertewas significant because it upheld the constitutionality
of searches at fixed checkpoints, which were described by the Court as a
de minimis intrusion on the Fourth Amendment right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 0 2 Although the Supreme Court has

maintained that aliens are entitled to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment,0 3 it also has eroded that right by holding in L6pez-Mendoza
that illegally obtained evidence need not be excluded in a civil deportation
hearing because the benefits obtained from excluding reliable evidence
from a deportation proceeding would not "outweigh the social cost" of
permitting illegal aliens to remain in the United States."' In a perverse
reversal of Justice Cardozo's admonition that the criminal shall go free
because of the Constable's blunder, Justice O'Connor reasoned that it was
never suggested that the criminal had to go free in this country and that
deported aliens were allowed to go "free" in Mexico. 0 5
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court further eroded Fourth Amendment
protections by holding that a Mexican national who was legally in the
United States, but was brought here against his will by law enforcement,
was insufficiently connected to the United States to be considered one of
"the people," reasoning that "the people" was a term of art designed to
describe persons who were somehow politically "connected" to the United
States.206

There are three distinct claims or concerns entailed in the issues
addressed in this Essay. The first issue, or area of concern, is the extent to
which the so-called Mexican Exception is similar to other constitutionally
recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, such as the moving
automobile or plain view exceptions, or the Open Fields Doctrine. The
Open Fields Doctrine, for example, obviously has greater impact on
homeless persons and others who do not own property, but critics will
argue that it does not mean that there is a "homeless" exception to the
197.
198.
199.
200.

See generally United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
See generally United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973).
SeegenerallyGonzalez-Riverav. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).
See generally United States v. Salinas, 940 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1991).

201. See generally Mallides, 473 F.2d at 859.

202. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976).
203. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
204. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
205. Id. at 1047.

206. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264-66 (1990).
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Fourth Amendment. Poor people are similarly more likely to be viewed
suspiciously by law enforcement, but that would not justify the inference
of a "poor person exception" to the Fourth Amendment.
Some will argue that there is no Mexican Exception and that being
Mexican-looking may be considered as one of several articulable facts in
inferring reasonable suspicion. In UnitedStatesv. Sokalow,"7 the Supreme
Court held that just because a person is involved in innocent activity, that
is not a reason to preclude the police from using innocent activity as one
of several factors which together may justify an inference of suspicious
conduct which would justify the stop.

°8

Mexican appearance similarly is

a factor, that in conjunction with other factors, may be used to infer
reasonable suspicion by an officer.
The second area of concern is whether there is a double standard in the
treatment of "Mexican-looking" immigrants and the treatment of other
immigrants. While the rules are said to be racially neutral and Border
Patrol agents are ostensibly simply seeking to stop and to apprehend any
foreign-looking person that arouses suspicion and appears to be in this
country illegally, to be transporting illegals, or to be involved in the drug
traffic, the reality is that officers are largely looking for suspicious conduct
among Mexican-looking persons. Every Mexican crossing the border
knows that it is those persons who are more indigenous-looking who are
more apt to be stopped. Even Mallides, a naturalized citizen from Iraq, was
stopped because he was in the company of five other Mexican-looking
persons and because he was presumed to be Mexican." ° Although there
has been a recent influx of Russian and Eastern European immigrants,
there is no indication that Border Patrol agents are looking for Russian-or
Eastern European-looking persons who act suspiciously. The problem of
course is that most Russian and Eastern European immigrants are
phenotypically indistinguishable from other Anglo-Americans.
Indeed, in the society at large, the word "illegal alien" has become
virtually synonymous with being Mexican, as noted in the political
campaign in support of California Proposition 187.10 The reality is that the

vast majority of those who are stopped, questioned, and apprehended as a
result of Border Patrol stops are largely Mexican-appearing persons.211
Renato Rosaldo notes that a large number of people in the United States

207. 490 U.S. I (1989).
208. Id. at 9-10.

209.
210.
Nov. 13,
211.

See United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 860 n. I (9th Cir. 1973).
Ruben Navarett, Jr., At the Birth of a New-and Younger-Latino Activism, L.A. TIMES,
1994, 5-6, available at http://www.navarrette.com/latimes/941113.html.
Scott Baldauf, Border Patrol Criticized for a Form of 'Profiling,' CHRISTIAN So.

MONITOR, Oct. 27, 2000,
p s3.htm.

5-6, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/10/27/
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have called into question the citizenship status of Latinos by using terms
such as "alien" or "illegal" to describe undocumented workers."'2 "By a
psychological and cultural mechanism of association all Latinos are thus
declared to have a blemish that brands us with the stigma of being outside
the law. We always live with that mark indicating that whether or not we
belong in this country is always in question."2 3
The idea of a Mexican Exception to the Fourth Amendment is
consistent with the recent movement toward closing the borders to noncitizens and denying basic due process protections to suspected terrorists.
In a study of the Promise Enforcement cases, Victor C. Romero suggests
that recent Supreme Court decisions on immigrants' rights favor
conceptions of rights based on membership in the national community, or
citizenship, over those based on personhood. 214 Federal courts appear to be
increasingly reluctant to extend basic due process and equal protection
guarantees under the Constitution to all persons, including non-citizens." 5
Romero advocates the personhood paradigm and eliminating "invidious
stereotypes of the noncitizens as the 'alien' and by embracing instead the
notion2of
equal personhood" to all regardless of citizenship or immigration
16
status.

Since most undocumented persons are of Mexican origin, and since
Mexican-appearing persons are often confused with Middle-Easterners, the
increased security measures that have been implemented in the "Post-9 1
Era" have had an adverse impact on the Latino population in the United
States. Mexican-looking persons thus face a double jeopardy of sorts in
that their physical appearance makes them more vulnerable to being
stopped both as suspected "illegal aliens" and as would-be terrorists.
A third, final issue of concern is the treatment of Latinos who are
traveling in the vicinity of the border. The so-called Mexican Exception
is important because it infringes on the constitutional rights of all Latinos,
regardless of place of birth or immigration status. As the court noted in
Mallides, "Mexican-Americans as well as other Americans regularly ride
in automobiles, often more than four in a big sedan. It is impossible to
determine from looking at a person of Mexican descent whether he is an
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citizen, a Mexican national..., or a Mexican alien without
American
2 17
papers.9

The danger of course is that while these stops may lead to successful
apprehensions, deportations, and prosecutions, they are based largely on
racial profiling and racial stereotyping and abridge the Fourth Amendment
rights of thousands of persons who are legally in this country and have
committed no crimes. "Thus, Border Patrol officers may use racial
stereotypes as a proxy for illegal conduct without being subjectively aware
of doing so.""' It is, therefore, imperative that courts use an objective
standard in judging the reasonableness of the stop.
The so-called Mexican Exception to the Fourth Amendment has vast
implications for Latinos and all Mexican-appearing persons, regardless of
place of birth, citizenship, or immigration status. As Justice Brennan noted
in his eloquent dissenting opinion in Martinez-Fuerte,
Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every
Mexican alien lawfully in this country must know after
today's decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint highways
at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop, but also to
detention and interrogation, both prolonged and to an extent
far more than non-Mexican appearing motorists.219
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